[Cumberland, MD]

As Alexander Hamilton was helping to shape the federal government’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion crisis over the summer and fall of 1794, the question of just what armed forces to place in the field was a thorny one.

Many Americans—particularly those in parts of the rural backcountry—remained suspicious of the new government’s powers and modes of operation. Dispatching troops of the regular, or so-called “standing army,” out among the people to enforce unpopular laws made by distant legislative bodies was a key grievance both during the American Revolution and, a century earlier, during the reign of James II in England.

Both of those conflicts resulted in revolution—and what we might now term “regime change.” Hamilton’s zeal against the western insurrectionists was intense, but even he had to be mindful to prevent pouring gas on the fire of revolutionary sentiment against the new U.S. Constitution.

And so, the George Washington administration’s ultimate decision was to deploy state militia against the Whiskey Rebels. State militia, it was felt, was a body of soldiery more representative of the people than army troops would be. Washington thought that this choice would have the salubrious effect of legitimizing the coming military operation, while reflecting positively on the nature of the federal government.

Four states were tapped to contribute militia forces to the anti-insurrection mission. These were: Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey. Fort Cumberland was designated as the rendezvous point for the quota to be supplied by Virginia. 

Fort Cumberland was one of several forts whose strategic importance lied in standing beyond the Allegheny Mountains. The fort was originally built by Scotland-born Colonel James Innes in September, 1754.

Traversing these comparatively low but steep and heavily-wooded mountains posed great difficulties for wagon trains of necessary military supplies and for heavy, horse-drawn artillery weapons. Such over-the-mountain forts had to be at least minimally maintained and staffed for the state to have any hope of being able to respond to local conflicts and emergencies.

After leaving Carlisle, Pennsylvania, days earlier, George Washington and Alexander Hamilton proceeded to Fort Cumberland and arrived by October 17, 1794.

Washington reviewed the Virginia militia, and Hamilton, among other things, worked to deal with some rocky logistics issues that had cropped up regarding feeding and supplying the men in uniform. Leading Pennsylvania’s militia quota was the Commonweath’s governor, Thomas Mifflin, and Mifflin had felt that the men under his command were greatly compromised by “defects and disappointments” in their state of readiness.

While Hamilton would leave Fort Cumberland and head on to confront the insurrectionists to the northwest, Washington was heading back to Philadelphia, feeling it was more important for him to be leading from the seat of executive power rather than in potential combat on the American frontier.

The visit to Fort Cumberland was not Washington’s first. He had operated in the area extensively during the French and Indian War in the 1750s. He was then an aide to British General Edward Braddock, who in 1755 stayed at Fort Cumberland for a period of weeks to improve its ability to function as a strategic position between the Chesapeake and the enemy French-controlled areas in Canada, the Mississippi Valley, and modern Pittsburgh.

By the early 19th Century, the need to maintain a fort in this part of the country was no longer an urgency. A local Episcopalian Church congregation erected a house of worship on the site, replaced by a more permanent facility—Emmanual Parish—in 1851. Emmanuel Parish stands to this day, and offers historical tours.

[Cumberland, MD]

As Alexander Hamilton was helping to shape the federal government’s response to the Whiskey Rebellion crisis over the summer and fall of 1794, the question of just what armed forces to place in the field was a thorny one.

Many Americans—particularly those in parts of the rural backcountry—remained suspicious of the new government’s powers and modes of operation. Dispatching troops of the regular, or so-called “standing army,” out among the people to enforce unpopular laws made by distant legislative bodies was a key grievance both during the American Revolution and, a century earlier, during the reign of James II in England.

Both of those conflicts resulted in revolution—and what we might now term “regime change.” Hamilton’s zeal against the western insurrectionists was intense, but even he had to be mindful to prevent pouring gas on the fire of revolutionary sentiment against the new U.S. Constitution.

And so, the George Washington administration’s ultimate decision was to deploy state militia against the Whiskey Rebels. State militia, it was felt, was a body of soldiery more representative of the people than army troops would be. Washington thought that this choice would have the salubrious effect of legitimizing the coming military operation, while reflecting positively on the nature of the federal government.

Four states were tapped to contribute militia forces to the anti-insurrection mission. These were: Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey. Fort Cumberland was designated as the rendezvous point for the quota to be supplied by Virginia. 

Fort Cumberland was one of several forts whose strategic importance lied in standing beyond the Allegheny Mountains. The fort was originally built by Scotland-born Colonel James Innes in September, 1754.

Traversing these comparatively low but steep and heavily-wooded mountains posed great difficulties for wagon trains of necessary military supplies and for heavy, horse-drawn artillery weapons. Such over-the-mountain forts had to be at least minimally maintained and staffed for the state to have any hope of being able to respond to local conflicts and emergencies.

After leaving Carlisle, Pennsylvania, days earlier, George Washington and Alexander Hamilton proceeded to Fort Cumberland and arrived by October 17, 1794.

Washington reviewed the Virginia militia, and Hamilton, among other things, worked to deal with some rocky logistics issues that had cropped up regarding feeding and supplying the men in uniform. Leading Pennsylvania’s militia quota was the Commonweath’s governor, Thomas Mifflin, and Mifflin had felt that the men under his command were greatly compromised by “defects and disappointments” in their state of readiness.

While Hamilton would leave Fort Cumberland and head on to confront the insurrectionists to the northwest, Washington was heading back to Philadelphia, feeling it was more important for him to be leading from the seat of executive power rather than in potential combat on the American frontier.

The visit to Fort Cumberland was not Washington’s first. He had operated in the area extensively during the French and Indian War in the 1750s. He was then an aide to British General Edward Braddock, who in 1755 stayed at Fort Cumberland for a period of weeks to improve its ability to function as a strategic position between the Chesapeake and the enemy French-controlled areas in Canada, the Mississippi Valley, and modern Pittsburgh.

By the early 19th Century, the need to maintain a fort in this part of the country was no longer an urgency. A local Episcopalian Church congregation erected a house of worship on the site, replaced by a more permanent facility—Emmanual Parish—in 1851. Emmanuel Parish stands to this day, and offers historical tours.